

## Message Text

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ACTION H-03

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R 131630Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1885

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY RABAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 0416

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (CODEL IPU)

SUBJ: VISIT CODEL IPU

1. CODEL IPU ARRIVED FEBRUARY 11 ON SCHEDULE AND DEPARTED FEBRUARY 13 FOR RABAT. IN SPITE OF NUMEROUS LOGISTICS PROBLEMS, COMPLICATED BY OUR LIMITED STAFFING, VISIT WENT WELL. ONLY CONTACT OF IMPORTANCE WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS WAS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE LATE AFTERNOON FEBRUARY 12. SENATORS BAYH AND METCALF AND REPRESENTATIVES JARMAN, PEPPER, MCCLORY AND DERWINSKI PRESENT. I ACCOMPANIED.

2. BOUMEDIENE SPOKE IN TERMS WHICH ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY FAMILIAR TO ME (THIS IS THE FOURTH SUCH DIALOGUE IN AS MANY WEEKS) BUT FOR THE RECORD FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SOME OF MORE INTERESTING POINTS PRESIDENT RAISED.

3. PRESIDENT BEGAN BY SAYING THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM CONGRESS ONLY LISTENED WITH ONE EAR. IT HAD HEARD WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TO SAY BUT DID NOT LISTEN TO THE ARABS. THIS WAS A MISTAKE. AMERICANS HAD IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND SHOULD DO SOMETHING TO PROTECT THEM. THERE WERE NO BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN AMERICANS AND ARABS, ONLY THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE. HE HAD NOTED THAT OUR POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL WAS STABLE. EACH TIME A NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENT ASSUMED OFFICE HE FOLLOWED THE

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POLICIES OF HIS PREDECESSOR WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL. THERE

WAS LESS CONSISTENCY WITH REGARD TO THE ARABS. SOME PRESIDENTS WERE FRIENDLY, OTHERS WERE NOT. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY AMERICANS IN GENERAL AND CONGRESS IN PARTICULAR WERE NOT MORE OPEN TO IDEA OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ARABS. DURING SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE SEVERAL MEMBERS OF PARTY ASSURED PRESIDENT THEY WERE LISTENING WITH BOTH EARS, AND POINTED OUT MORAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL AND POLITICAL FACTS OF LIFE WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING FOREIGN POLICY.

4. PRESIDENT SAID WORLD NO LONGER DIVIDED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ALONG LINES OF COLD WAR BUT DIVIDED INTO INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS AND DEVELOPING NATIONS. SOVIET UNION WAS INDUSTRIALIZED NATION, CHINA WAS NOT YET ONE AND WAS STILL PART OF THIRD WORLD. THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES GRATIFIED THAT STRAINS OF COLD WAR HAD EASED BUT STILL APPREHENSIVE THAT SUPER POWERS MIGHT MAKE AGREEMENTS AT THEIR EXPENSE. US AND USSR TENDED THINK IN TERMS BALANCE OF POWER AND BALANCE OF ACCOUNTS. ONE PUSHED A PAWN FORWARD AND THE OTHER RESPONDED WITH ANOTHER PAWN. WHAT MATTERED TO THEM WAS THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE GAME, NOT WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PAWN. THIRD WORLD FEARED THAT WHEN US AND SOVIETS MET TOGETHER THEY WOULD TREAD ON INTERESTS OF LESSER COUNTRIES.

5. BOUMEDIENE SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT PALESTINE PROBLEM AND WAS MORE ANIMATED IN DISCUSSION THAN I HAVE SEEN HIM BEFORE. HE REPEATED HIS GENERAL VIEWS THAT THE FOUR PARTIES TO THE PROBLEM WERE EGYPT, SYRIA, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS AND THAT NO SOLUTION WOULD WORK WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY PALESTINIANS. HE SAID US SHOULD NOT TRY GET SADAT MAKE SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF SADAT. SADAT'S WHOLE FUTURE DEPENDED UPON A SOLUTION. BOUMEDIENE ALSO FELT THAT A SOLUTION WAS IMPERATIVE AND THAT IT LAY WITHIN AMERICA'S POWER TO BRING IT ABOUT. HE SAID WE SHOULD NOT WASTE TIME WITH HUSAYN, WHO WAS OF SOME IMPORTANCE WHEN WE WERE ENGAGED IN A CONFRONTATION WITH CAIRO BUT WAS NOT NEEDED NOW THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT WERE GOOD. HE DID NOT REPRESENT ANYBODY EXCEPT TRANSJORDAN IN ANY EVENT. MEMBERS OF THE

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PARTY TRIED PIN BOUMEDIENE DOWN AS TO WHETHER HE THOUGHT ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS WOULD INDEED GIVE PEACE IN EXCHANGE FOR WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 BORDERS. BOUMEDIENE'S RESPONSE WAS THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS NECESSARY AS MATTER OF JUSTICE TO BEGIN WITH AND THAT IN ANY EVENT UNITED STATES GUARANTEED ISRAELI EXISTENCE. ISRAEL'S CONTENTION THAT IT DEPENDED ON ITSELF FOR DEFENSE WAS NONSENSE, AS HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED DURING RAMADAN WAR. HE SAID TALK

OF SECULAR STATE MIGHT BE PREMATURE BUT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY ARAFAT AND OTHERS COULD NOT AT LEAST HAVE THIS DREAM AND HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THIS WAS GOING TO BE THE EVENTUAL SOLUTION AT SOME UNDETERMINED POINT IN THE FUTURE. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALGERIA, NOT BEING A NEIGHBOR OF ISRAEL, WAS NOT GOING TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERMINING OUTLINE OF SETTLEMENT BUT HE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ARAB POSITIONS INCLUDING SADAT'S.

6. DELEGATION WAS INTRIGUED THAT BOUMEDIENE SAID THEY HAD ASKED SADAT ABOUT NON-BELLIGERENCY AND SADAT HAD SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE IT IN EXHCANGE FOR WITHDRAWAL. THEY SAID HE HAD ACCURATELY DESCRIBED EXCHANGE AND WONDERED WHETHER EGYPTIANS HAD ALERTED HIM TO ITS HAVING TAKEN PLACE OR WHETHER EGYPTIAN PRESS REPORTED IT, OR WHETHER BOUMEDIENE WAS JUST REPEATING WHAT HE ASSUMED HAD TAKEN PLACE BECAUSE HE KNEW SADAT'S POSITION ALREADY. WOULD APPRECIATE CAIRO'S COMMENT THIS REGARD.

7. BOUMEDIENE SAID HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE SUPPORTED ARAFAT, WHOM HE CONSIDERED A MODERATE. EXTREMISTS SUCH AS GEORGE HABBASH CONSIDERED ARAFAT A TRAITOR BECAUSE HE WAS PREPARED RELINQUISH TWO-THIRDS OF PALESTINIAN HOMELAND.

8. BILATERAL RELATIONS: BOUMEDIENE SAID HE THOUGHT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE GOOD. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE SOME PROBLEMS. BEFORE IT HAD BEEN VIETNAM WHICH WAS BETWEENUS, NOW THERE WERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SHAPING UP. HE SAID INDIVIDUAL ALGERIANS WERE WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS AMERICANS AND HE WAS SURE NO AMERICAN IN ALGERIA HAD BEEN ATTACKED OR HARMED BY ALGERIANS DURING

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PERIOD WHEN THERE WERE NO RELATIONS. ALGERIANS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN OUR TECHNOLOGY AND IN OUR EQUIPMENT. THEY WERE SPENDING LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES AND HOPED TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. HE DID NOT GET INTO OIL PRICE QUESTION, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE SPENT SO MUCH TIME ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM. THE CONVERSATION LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF AS IT WAS.

9. CONCLUSION: BELIEVE EXPOSURE WAS USEFUL FOR BOTH SIDES. EACH MEMBER OF DELEGATION SPOKE UP IN TURN TO COMMENT ON PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AND POSE QUESTIONS OF HIS OWN. THEY WERE FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY BOUMEDIENE'S OBVIOUS INTELLIGENCE AND AGILITY AND BY HIS GRASP OF PROBLEMS. BELIEVE BOUMEDIENE WAS ALSO IMPRESSED WITH SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE OF DELEGATION, WHICH DID ITS BEST REASSURE HIM WE NOT OUT TO GET

ALGERIA OR ANY ONE ELSE AND THAT OUR POLICIES SINCERELY  
DIRECTED TO IMPROVE CLIMATE OF COOPERATION AND PEACE IN  
WORLD.PARKER

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